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Abstract
Despite the efficacy on a variety of computer vision tasks, deep neural net-
works (DNNs) are vulnerable to adversarial attacks, limiting their applications
in security-critical systems. Recent works have shown the possibility of gen-
erating imperceptibly perturbed image inputs (a.k.a., adversarial examples) to
fool well-trained DNN classifiers into making arbitrary predictions. To address
this problem, we propose a training recipe named “deep defense”. Our core
idea is to integrate an adversarial perturbation-based regularizer into the clas-
sification objective, such that the obtained models learn to resist potential at-
tacks, directly and precisely. The whole optimization problem is solved just like
training a recursive network. Experimental results demonstrate that our method
outperforms training with adversarial/Parseval regularizations by large margins
on various datasets (including MNIST, CIFAR-10 and ImageNet) and different
DNN architectures. Code and models for reproducing our results are available at
https://github.com/ZiangYan/deepdefense.pytorch.
1 Introduction
Although deep neural networks (DNNs) have advanced the state-of-the-art of many challenging
computer vision tasks, they are vulnerable to adversarial examples [34] (i.e., generated images which
seem perceptually similar to the real ones but are intentionally formed to fool learning models).
A general way of synthesizing the adversarial examples is to apply worst-case perturbations to real
images [34, 8, 26, 3]. With proper strategies, the required perturbations for fooling a DNN model can
be 1000× smaller in magnitude when compared with the real images, making them imperceptible to
human beings. It has been reported that even the state-of-the-art DNN solutions have been fooled to
misclassify such examples with high confidence [18]. Worse, the adversarial perturbation can transfer
across different images and network architectures [25]. Such transferability also allows black-box
attacks, which means the adversary may succeed without having any knowledge about the model
architecture or parameters [28].
Though intriguing, such property of DNNs can lead to potential issues in real-world applications
like self-driving cars and paying with your face systems. Unlike certain instability against random
noise, which is theoretically and practically guaranteed to be less critical [7, 34], the vulnerability
to adversarial perturbations is still severe in deep learning. Multiple attempts have been made to
analyze and explain it so far [34, 8, 5, 14]. For example, Goodfellow et al. [8] argue that the main
*The first two authors contributed equally to this work.
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reason why DNNs are vulnerable is their linear nature instead of nonlinearity and overfitting. Based
on the explanation, they design an efficient l∞ induced perturbation and further propose to combine
it with adversarial training [34] for regularization. Recently, Cisse et al. [5] investigate the Lipschitz
constant of DNN-based classifiers and propose Parseval training. However, similar to some previous
and contemporary methods, approximations to the theoretically optimal constraint are required in
practice, making the method less effective to resist very strong attacks.
In this paper, we introduce “deep defense”, an adversarial regularization method to train DNNs with
improved robustness. Unlike many existing and contemporaneous methods which make approxima-
tions and optimize possibly untight bounds, we precisely integrate a perturbation-based regularizer
into the classification objective. This endows DNN models with an ability of directly learning from at-
tacks and further resisting them, in a principled way. Specifically, we penalize the norm of adversarial
perturbations, by encouraging relatively large values for the correctly classified samples and possibly
small values for those misclassified ones. As a regularizer, it is jointly optimized with the original
learning objective and the whole problem is efficiently solved through being considered as training
a recursive-flavoured network. Extensive experiments on MNIST, CIFAR-10 and ImageNet show
that our method significantly improves the robustness of different DNNs under advanced adversarial
attacks, in the meanwhile no accuracy degradation is observed.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First, we briefly introduce and discuss represen-
tative methods for conducting adversarial attacks and defenses in Section 2. Then we elaborate on
the motivation and basic ideas of our method in Section 3. Section 4 provides implementation details
of our method and experimentally compares it with the state-of-the-arts, and finally, Section 5 draws
the conclusions.
2 Related Work
Adversarial Attacks. Starting from a common objective, many attack methods have been proposed.
Szegedy et al. [34] propose to generate adversarial perturbations by minimizing a vector norm using
box-constrained L-BFGS optimization. For better efficiency, Goodfellow et al. [8] develop the fast
gradient sign (FGS) attack, by choosing the sign of gradient as the direction of perturbation since it is
approximately optimal under a `∞ constraint. Later, Kurakin et al. [18] present an iterative version
of the FGS attack by applying it multiple times with a small step size, and clipping pixel values on
internal results. Similarly, Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [26] propose DeepFool as an iterative lp attack. At
each iteration, it linearizes the network and seeks the smallest perturbation to transform current images
towards the linearized decision boundary. Some more detailed explanations of DeepFool can be found
in Section 3.1. More recently, Carlini and Wagner [4] reformulate attacks as optimization instances
that can be solved using stochastic gradient descent to generate more sophisticated adversarial
examples. Based on the above methods, input- and network- agnostic adversarial examples can also
be generated [25, 28].
Defenses. Resisting adversarial attacks is challenging. It has been empirically studied that con-
ventional regularization strategies such as dropout, weight decay and distorting training data (with
random noise) do not really solve the problem [8]. Fine-tuning networks using adversarial examples,
namely adversarial training [34], is a simple yet effective approach to perform defense and relieve the
problem [8, 18], for which the examples can be generated either online [8] or offline [26]. Adversarial
training works well on small datasets such as MNIST and CIFAR. Nevertheless, as Kurakin et al. [18]
have reported, it may result in a decreased benign-set accuracy on large-scale datasets like ImageNet.
An alternative way of defending such attacks is to train a detector, to detect and reject adversarial
examples. Metzen et al. [23] utilize a binary classifier which takes intermediate representations as
input for detection, and Lu et al. [21] propose to invoke an RBF-SVM operating on discrete codes
from late stage ReLUs. However, it is possible to perform attacks on the joint system if an adversary
has access to the parameters of such a detector. Furthermore, it is still in doubt whether the adversarial
examples are intrinsically different from the benign ones [3].
Another effective work is to exploit distillation [30], but it also slightly degrades the benign-set
accuracy and may be broken by C&W’s attack [4]. Alemi et al. [1] present an information theo-
retic method which helps on improving the resistance to adversarial attacks too. Some recent and
contemporaneous works also propose to utilize gradient masking [29] as defenses [6, 35, 2].
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Figure 1: Top left: The recursive-flavoured network which takes a reshaped image xk as input and
sequentially compute each perturbation component by using a pre-designed attack module. Top right:
an example for generating the first component, in which the three elbow double-arrow connectors
indicate weight-sharing fully-connected layers and index-sharing between ReLU activation layers.
Bottom: the attack module for n-class (n ≥ 2) scenarios.
Several regularization-based methods have also been proposed. For example, Gu and Rigazio [9]
propose to penalize the Frobenius norm of the Jacobian matrix in a layer-wise fashion. Recently,
Cisse et al. [5] and Hein and Audriushchenko [14] theoretically show that the sensitivity to adversarial
examples can be controlled by the Lipschitz constant of DNNs and propose Parseval training and
cross-Lipschitz regularization, respectively. However, these methods usually require approximations,
making them less effective to defend very strong and advanced adversarial attacks.
As a regularization-based method, our Deep Defense is orthogonal to the adversarial training, defense
distillation and detecting then rejecting methods. It also differs from previous and contemporaneous
regularization-based methods (e.g. [9, 5, 14, 31]) in a way that it endows DNNs the ability of directly
learning from adversarial examples and precisely resisting them.
3 Our Deep Defense Method
Many methods regularize the learning objective of DNNs approximately, which may lead to a de-
graded prediction accuracy on the benign test sets or unsatisfactory robustness to advanced adversarial
examples. We reckon it can be more beneficial to incorporate advanced attack modules into the learn-
ing process and learn to maximize a margin. In this section, we first briefly analyze a representative
gradient-based attack and then introduce our solution to learn from it.
3.1 Generate Adversarial Examples
As discussed, a lot of efforts have been devoted to generating adversarial examples. Let us take the l2
DeepFool as an example here. It is able to conduct 100% successful attacks on advanced networks.
Mathematically, starting from a binary classifier f : Rm → R which makes predictions (to the class
label) based on the sign of its outputs, DeepFool generates the adversarial perturbation ∆x for an
arbitrary input vector x ∈ Rm in a heuristic way. Concretely, ∆x = r(0) + ...+ r(u−1), in which the
i-th (0 ≤ i < u) addend r(i) is obtained by taking advantage of the Taylor’s theorem and solving:
min
r
‖r‖2 s.t. f(x+ ∆(i)x ) +∇f(x+ ∆(i)x )T r = 0, (1)
in which ∆(i)x :=
∑i−1
j=0 r
(j), function ∇f denotes the gradient of f w.r.t. its input, and operator
‖ · ‖2 denotes the l2 (i.e., Euclidean) norm. Obviously, Equation (1) has a closed-form solution as:
r(i) = − f(x+ ∆
(i)
x )
‖∇f(x+ ∆(i)x )‖2
∇f(x+ ∆(i)x ). (2)
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By sequentially calculating all the r(i)s with (2), DeepFool employs a faithful approximation to
the ∆x of minimal l2 norm. In general, the approximation algorithm converges in a reasonably
small number of iterations even when f is a non-linear function represented by a very deep neural
network, making it both effective and efficient in practical usage. The for-loop for calculating r(i)s
ends in advance if the attack goal sgn(f(x+ ∆(i)x )) 6= sgn(f(x)) is already reached at any iteration
i < u− 1. Similarly, such strategy also works for the adversarial attacks to multi-class classifiers,
which only additionally requires a specified target label in each iteration of the algorithm.
3.2 Perturbation-based Regularization
Our target is to improve the robustness of off-the-shelf networks without modifying their architectures,
hence giving a ‖∆x‖p-based (p ∈ [1,∞)) regularization to their original objective function seems to
be a solution.
Considering the aforementioned attacks which utilize∇f when generating the perturbation ∆x [34,
8, 26, 36], their strategy can be technically regarded as a function parameterized by the same set
of learnable parameters as that of f . Therefore, it is possible that we jointly optimize the original
network objective and a scaled ‖∆x‖p as a regularization for some chosen norm operator ‖ · ‖p,
provided ‖∆x‖p is differentiable. Specifically, given a set of training samples {(xk,yk)} and a
parameterized function f , we may want to optimize:
min
W
∑
k
L(yk, f(xk;W)) + λ
∑
k
R
(
−‖∆xk‖p‖xk‖p
)
, (3)
in which the setW exhaustively collects learnable parameters of f , and ‖xk‖p is a normalization
factor for ‖∆xk‖p. As will be further detailed in Section 3.4, function R should treat incorrectly and
correctly classified samples differently, and it should be monotonically increasing on the latter such
that it gives preference to those fs resisting small ‖∆xk‖p/‖xk‖p anyway (e.g., R(t) = exp(t)).
Regarding the DNN representations,W may comprise the weight and bias of network connections,
means and variances of batch normalization layers [16], and slops of the parameterized ReLU
layers [12].
3.3 Network-based Formulation
As previously discussed, we re-formulate the adversarial perturbation as ∆xk = g(xk;W), in which
g need to be differentiable except for maybe certain points, so that problem (3) can be solved using
stochastic gradient descent following the chain rule. In order to make the computation more efficient
and easily parallelized, an explicit formulation of g or its gradient w.r.t W is required. Here we
accomplish this task by representing g as a “reverse” network to the original one. Taking a two-class
multi-layer perceptron (MLP) as an example, we haveW = {W0,b0,w1, b1} and
f(xk;W) = wT1 h(WT0 xk + b0) + b1, (4)
in which h denotes the non-linear activation function and we choose h(WT0 xk + b0) :=
max(WT0 xk + b0,0) (i.e.as the ReLU activation function) in this paper since it is commonly
used. Let us further denote ak := h(WT0 xk + b0) and yˆk := f(xk;W), then we have
∇f(xk;W) = W0(1>0(ak)⊗w1), (5)
in which ⊗ indicates the element-wise product of two matrices, and 1>0 is an element-wise indicator
function that compares the entries of its input with zero.
We choose ∆xk as the previously introduced DeepFool perturbation for simplicity of notation
1.
Based on Equation (2) and (5), we construct a recursive-flavoured regularizer network (as illustrated
in the top left of Figure 1) to calculate R(−‖∆xk‖p/‖xk‖p). It takes image xk as input and calculate
each addend for ∆xk by utilizing an incorporated multi-layer attack module (as illustrated in the top
right of Figure 1). Apparently, the original three-layer MLP followed by a multiplicative inverse
operator makes up the first half of the attack module and its “reverse” followed by a norm-based
rescaling operator makes up the second half. It can be easily proved that the designed network is
differentiable w.r.t. each element of W , except for certain points. As sketched in the bottom of
1Note that our method also naturally applies to some other gradient-based adversarial attacks.
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Figure 1, such a network-based formulation can also be naturally generalized to regularize multi-class
MLPs with more than one output neurons (i.e., yˆk ∈ Rn, ∇f(xk;W) ∈ Rm×n and n > 1). We
use I ∈ Rn×n to indicate the identity matrix, and lˆk, lk to indicate the one-hot encoding of current
prediction label and a chosen label to fool in the first iteration, respectively.
Seeing that current winning DNNs are constructed as a stack of convolution, non-linear activation
(e.g., ReLU, parameterized ReLU and sigmoid), normalization (e.g., local response normalization [17]
and batch normalization), pooling and fully-connected layers, their ∇f functions, and thus the g
functions, should be differentiable almost everywhere. Consequently, feasible “reverse” layers can
always be made available to these popular layer types. In addition to the above explored ones (i.e.,
ReLU and fully-connected layers), we also have deconvolution layers [27] which are reverse to the
convolution layers, and unpooling layers [38] which are reverse to the pooling layers, etc.. Just note
that some learning parameters and variables like filter banks and pooling indices should be shared
among them.
3.4 Robustness and Accuracy
Problem (3) integrates an adversarial perturbation-based regularization into the classification objective,
which should endow parameterized models with the ability of learning from adversarial attacks and
resisting them. Additionally, it is also crucial not to diminish the inference accuracy on benign sets.
Goodfellow et al. [8] have shown the possibility of fulfilling such expectation in a data augmentation
manner. Here we explore more on our robust regularization to ensure it does not degrade benign-set
accuracies either.
Most attacks treat all the input samples equally [34, 8, 26, 18], regardless of whether or not their
predictions match the ground-truth labels. It makes sense when we aim to fool the networks, but not
when we leverage the attack module to supervise training. Specifically, we might expect a decrease
in ‖∆xk‖p/‖xk‖p from any misclassified sample xk, especially when the network is to be “fooled”
to classify it as its ground-truth. This seems different with the objective as formulated in (3), which
appears to enlarge the adversarial perturbations for all training samples.
Moreover, we found it difficult to seek reasonable trade-offs between robustness and accuracy, if
R is a linear function (e.g., R(z) = z). In that case, the regularization term is dominated by some
extremely “robust” samples, so the training samples with relatively small ‖∆xk‖p/‖xk‖p are not
fully optimized. This phenomenon can impose a negative impact on the classification objective L and
thus the inference accuracy. In fact, for those samples which are already “robust” enough, enlarging
‖∆xk‖p/‖xk‖p is not really necessary. It is appropriate to penalize more on the currently correctly
classified samples with abnormally small ‖∆xk‖p/‖xk‖p values than those with relatively large ones
(i.e., those already been considered “robust” in regard of f and ∆xk ).
To this end, we rewrite the second term in the objective function of Problem (3) as
λ
∑
k∈T
R
(
−c‖∆xk‖p‖xk‖p
)
+ λ
∑
k∈F
R
(
d
‖∆xk‖p
‖xk‖p
)
, (6)
in which F is the index set of misclassified training samples, T is its complement, c, d > 0 are two
scaling factors that balance the importance of different samples, and R is chosen as the exponential
function. With extremely small or large c, our method treats all the samples the same in T , otherwise
those with abnormally small ‖∆xk‖p/‖xk‖p will be penalized more than the others.
4 Experimental Results
In this section, we evaluate the efficacy of our method on three different datasets: MNIST, CIFAR-10
and ImageNet [32]. We compare our method with adversarial training and Parseval training (also
known as Parseval networks). Similar to previous works [26, 1], we choose to fine-tune from pre-
trained models instead of training from scratch. Fine-tuning hyper-parameters can be found in the
supplementary materials. All our experiments are conducted on an NVIDIA GTX 1080 GPU. Our
main results are summarized in Table 1, where the fourth column demonstrates the inference accuracy
of different models on benign test images, the fifth column compares the robustness of different
models to DeepFool adversarial examples, and the subsequent columns compare the robustness to
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Table 1: Test set performance of different defense methods. Column 4: prediction accuracies on
benign examples. Column 5: ρ2 values under the DeepFool attack. Column 6-8: prediction accuracies
on the FGS adversarial examples.
Dataset Network Method Acc. ρ2 Acc.@0.2ref Acc.@0.5ref Acc.@1.0ref
MNIST
MLP
Reference 98.31% 1.11×10−1 72.76% 29.08% 3.31%
Par. Train 98.32% 1.11×10−1 77.44% 28.95% 2.96%
Adv. Train I 98.49% 1.62×10−1 87.70% 59.69% 22.55%
Ours 98.65% 2.25×10−1 95.04% 88.93% 50.00%
LeNet
Reference 99.02% 2.05×10−1 90.95% 53.88% 19.75%
Par. Train 99.10% 2.03×10−1 91.68% 66.48% 19.64%
Adv. Train I 99.18% 2.63×10−1 95.20% 74.82% 41.40%
Ours 99.34% 2.84×10−1 96.51% 88.93% 50.00%
CIFAR-10
ConvNet
Reference 79.74% 2.59×10−2 61.62% 37.84% 23.85%
Par. Train 80.48% 3.42×10−2 69.19% 50.43% 22.13%
Adv. Train I 80.65% 3.05×10−2 65.16% 45.03% 35.53%
Ours 81.70% 5.32×10−2 72.15% 59.02% 50.00%
NIN
Reference 89.64% 4.20×10−2 75.61% 49.22% 33.56%
Par. Train 88.20% 4.33×10−2 75.39% 49.75% 17.74%
Adv. Train I 89.87% 5.25×10−2 78.87% 58.85% 45.90%
Ours 89.96% 5.58×10−2 80.70% 70.73% 50.00%
ImageNet
AlexNet Reference 56.91% 2.98×10
−3 54.62% 51.39% 46.05%
Ours 57.11% 4.54×10−3 55.79% 53.50% 50.00%
ResNet Reference 69.64% 1.63×10
−3 63.39% 54.45% 41.70%
Ours 69.66% 2.43×10−3 65.53% 59.46% 50.00%
FGS adversarial examples. The evaluation metrics will be carefully explained in Section 4.1. Some
implementation details of the compared methods are shown as follows.
Deep Defense. There are three hyper-parameters in our method: λ, c and d. As previously explained
in Section 3.4, they balance the importance of the model robustness and benign-set accuracy. We fix
λ = 15, c = 25, d = 5 for MNIST and CIFAR-10 major experiments (except for NIN, c = 70), and
uniformly set λ = 5, c = 500, d = 5 for all ImageNet experiments. Practical impact of varying these
hyper-parameters will be discussed in Section 4.2. The Euclidean norm is simply chosen for ‖ · ‖p.
Adversarial Training. There exist many different versions of adversarial training [34, 8, 26, 18,
24, 22], partly because it can be combined with different attacks. Here we choose two of them, in
accordance with the adversarial attacks to be tested, and try out to reach their optimal performance.
First we evaluate the one introduced in the DeepFool paper [26], which utilizes a fixed adversarial
training set generated by DeepFool, and summarize its performance in Table 1 (see “Adv. Train I”).
We also test Goodfellow et al.’s adversarial training objective [8] (referred to as “Adv. Train II”)
and compare it with our method intensively (see supplementary materials), considering there exists
trade-offs between accuracies on benign and adversarial examples. In particular, a combined method
is also evaluated to testify our previous claim of orthogonality.
Parseval Training. Parseval training [5] improves the robustness of a DNN by controlling its global
Lipschitz constant. Practically, a projection update is performed after each stochastic gradient descent
iteration to ensure all weight matrices’ Parseval tightness. Following the original paper, we uniformly
sample 30% of columns to perform this update. We set the hyper-parameter β = 0.0001 for MNIST,
and β = 0.0003 for CIFAR-10 after doing grid search.
4.1 Evaluation Metrics
This subsection explains some evaluation metrics adopted in our experiments. Different lp (e.g., l2
and l∞) norms have been used to perform attacks. Here we conduct the famous FGS and DeepFool
as representatives of l∞ and l2 attacks and compare the robustness of obtained models using different
defense methods. As suggested in the paper [26], we evaluate model robustness by calculating
ρ2 :=
1
|D|
∑
k∈D
‖∆xk‖2
‖xk‖2 , (7)
in which D is the test set (for ImageNet we use its validation set), when DeepFool is used.
It is popular to evaluate the accuracy on a perturbed D as a metric for the FGS attack [9, 8, 5].
Likewise, we calculate the smallest  such that 50% of the perturbed images are misclassified by our
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Figure 2: Convergence curves. From left to right: test accuracy and ρ2 of MLP, and test accuracy and
ρ2 of LeNet. “Clean” indicates fine-tuning on benign examples. Best viewed in color.
regularized models and denote it as ref , then test prediction accuracies of those models produced
by adversarial and Parseval training at this level of perturbation (abbreviated as “Acc.@1.0ref” in
Table 1). Accuracies at lower levels of perturbations (a half and one fifth of ref ) are also reported.
Many other metrics will be introduced and used for further comparisons in supplementary materials.
4.2 Exploratory Experiments on MNIST
As a popular dataset for conducting adversarial attacks [34, 8, 26], MNIST is a reasonable choice for
us to get started. It consists of 70,000 grayscale images, in which 60,000 of them are used for training
and the remaining are used for test. We train a four-layer MLP and download a LeNet [19] structured
CNN model 2 as references (see supplementary materials for more details). For fair comparisons,
we use identical fine-tuning policies and hyper-parameters for different defense methods We cut the
learning rate by 2× after four epochs of training because it can be beneficial for convergence.
Robustness and accuracy. The accuracy of different models (on the benign test sets) can be found
in the fourth column of Table 1 and the robustness performance is compared in the last four columns.
We see Deep Defense consistently and significantly outperforms competitive methods in the sense of
both robustness and accuracy, even though our implementation of Adv. Train I achieves slightly better
results than those reported in [26]. Using our method, we obtain an MLP model with over 2× better
robustness to DeepFool and an absolute error decrease of 46.69% under the FGS attack considering
 = 1.0ref , while the inference accuracy also increases a lot (from 98.31% to 98.65% in comparison
with the reference model. The second best is Adv. Train I, which achieves roughly 1.5× and an
absolute 19.24% improvement under the DeepFool and FGS attacks, respectively. Parseval training
also yields models with improved robustness to the FGS attack, but they are still vulnerable to the
DeepFool. The superiority of our method holds on LeNet, and the benign-set accuracy increases
from 99.02% to 99.34% with the help of our method.
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Figure 3: The performance of Deep De-
fense with varying hyper-parameters on
LeNet. Best viewed in color.
Convergence curves of different methods are provided
in Figure 2, in which the “Clean” curve indicates fine-
tuning on the benign training set with the original learning
objective. Our method optimizes more sophisticated ob-
jective than the other methods so it takes longer to finally
converge. However, both its robustness and accuracy per-
formance surpasses that of the reference models in only
three epochs and keeps growing in the last two. Consis-
tent with results reported in [26], we also observe growing
accuracy and decreasing ρ2 on Adv. Train I.
In fact, the benefit of our method to test-set accuracy for
benign examples is unsurprising. From a geometrical point
of view, an accurate estimation of the optimal perturba-
tion like our ∆xk represents the distance from a benign
example xk to the decision boundary, so maximizing ‖∆xk‖ approximately maximizes the margin.
According to some previous theoretical works [37, 33], such regularization to the margin should
relieve the overfitting problem of complex learning models (including DNNs) and thus lead to better
test-set performance on benign examples.
Varying Hyper-parameters. Figure 3 illustrates the impact of the hyper-parameters in our method.
We fix d = 5 and try to vary c and λ in {5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45} and {5, 15, 25}, respectively.
2https://github.com/LTS4/DeepFool/blob/master/MATLAB/resources/net.mat
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Note that d is fixed here because it has relatively minor effect on our fine-tuning process on MNIST.
In the figure, different solid circles on the same curve indicate different values of c. From left to right,
they are calculated with decreasing c, which means a larger c encourages achieving a better accuracy
but lower robustness. Conversely, setting a very small c (e.g., c = 5) can yield models with high
robustness but low accuracies. By adjusting λ, one changes the numerical range of the regularizer. A
larger λ makes the regularizer contributes more to the whole objective function.
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Figure 4: The performance of Deep De-
fense when only one layer is regularized
for LeNet. Best viewed in color.
Layer-wise Regularization. We also investigate the im-
portance of different layers to the robustness of LeNet
with our Deep Defense method. Specifically, we mask the
gradient (by setting its elements to zero) of our adversarial
regularizer w.r.t. the learning parameters (e.g., weights and
biases) of all layers except one. By fixing λ = 15, d = 5
and varying c in the set {5, 15, 25, 35, 45}, we obtain 20
different models. Figure 4 demonstrates the ρ2 values and
benign-set accuracies of these models. Different points
on the same curve correspond to fine-tuning with differ-
ent values of c (decreasing from left to right). Legends
indicate the gradient of which layer is not masked. Appar-
ently, when only one layer is exploited to regularize the
classification objective, optimizing “fc1” achieves the best
performance. This is consistent with previous results that
“fc1” is the most “redundant” layer of LeNet [11, 10].
4.3 Image Classification Experiments
For image classification experiments, we testify the effectiveness of our method on several different
benchmark networks on the CIFAR-10 and ImageNet datasets.
CIFAR-10 results. We train two CNNs on CIFAR-10: one with the same architecture as in [15],
and the other with a network-in-network architecture [20]. Our training procedure is the same as
in [26]. We still compare our Deep Defense with adversarial and Parseval training by fine-tuning
from the references. Fine-tuning hyper-parameters are summarized in the supplementary materials.
Likewise, we cut the learning rate by 2× for the last 10 epochs.
Quantitative comparison results can be found in Table 1, in which the two chosen CNNs are referred
to as “ConvNet” and “NIN”, respectively. Obviously, our Deep Defense outperforms the other defense
methods considerably in all test cases. When compared with the reference models, our regularized
models achieve higher test-set accuracies on benign examples and gain absolute error decreases of
26.15% and 16.44% under the FGS attack. For the DeepFool attack which might be stronger, our
method gains 2.1× and 1.3× better robustness on the two networks.
ImageNet results. As a challenging classification dataset, ImageNet consists of millions of high-
resolution images [32]. To verify the efficacy and scalability of our method, we collect well-trained
AlexNet [17] and ResNet-18 [13] model from the Caffe and PyTorch model zoo respectively, fine-tune
them on the ILSVRC-2012 training set using our Deep Defense and test it on the validation set.
After only 10 epochs of fine-tuning for AlexNet and 1 epoch for ResNet, we achieve roughly 1.5×
improved robustness to the DeepFool attack on both architectures, along with a slightly increased
benign-set accuracy, highlighting the effectiveness of our method.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the vulnerability of DNNs to adversarial examples and propose a novel
method to address it, by incorporating an adversarial perturbation-based regularization into the
classification objective. This shall endow DNNs with an ability of directly learning from attacks and
precisely resisting them. We consider the joint optimization problem as learning a recursive-flavoured
network to solve it efficiently. Extensive experiments on MNIST, CIFAR-10 and ImageNet have
shown the effectiveness of our method. In particular, when combined with the FGS-based adversarial
learning, our method achieves even better results on various benchmarks. Future works shall include
explorations on resisting black-box attacks and attacks in the physical world.
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1 More Evaluation Metrics and Attacks
Table 2: Test performance of different methods in the sense of: l2 under DeepFool, ρ∞ under FGS,
l2 under the C&W attack, the prediction accuracy on PGD adversarial examples and the PASS score.
Dataset Network Method l2 (DeepFool) ρ∞ (FGS) l2 (C&W) Acc. (PGD) PASS
MNIST
MLP
Reference 0.81 5.40×10−2 0.84 1.19% 0.8534
Par. Train 0.80 5.78×10−2 0.83 1.18% 0.8542
Adv. Train I 1.17 9.46×10−2 1.17 4.11% 0.8280
Deep Defense 1.64 1.53×10−1 1.58 33.18% 0.8181
LeNet
Reference 1.48 1.29×10−1 1.40 26.17% 0.9074
Par. Train 1.50 1.50×10−1 1.58 23.06% 0.8981
Adv. Train I 1.90 2.05×10−1 1.71 50.67% 0.8810
Deep Defense 2.05 2.36×10−1 1.84 64.54% 0.8760
CIFAR-10
ConvNet
Reference 0.18 5.27×10−3 0.29 21.34% -
Par. Train 0.24 8.02×10−3 0.33 27.91% -
Adv. Train I 0.21 6.37×10−3 0.31 27.08% -
Deep Defense 0.36 1.58×10−2 0.47 45.05% -
NIN
Reference 0.30 1.05×10−2 0.41 34.41% -
Par. Train 0.31 1.07×10−2 0.41 36.59% -
Adv. Train I 0.37 1.76×10−2 0.48 45.51% -
Deep Defense 0.40 2.15×10−2 0.50 51.07% -
ImageNet
AlexNet Reference 0.29 5.46×10
−4 - - -
Deep Defense 0.45 8.70×10−4 - - -
ResNet Reference 0.69 6.96×10
−4 - - -
Deep Defense 1.03 1.08×10−3 - - -
In this paper, we leave the optimal choice of evaluation metric an open question and simply choose
some popular ones following previous works. Here in the supplementary material we try to test as
many as possible to verify the effectiveness of our method extensively.
In the main body of our paper, we utilize the normalized l2 norm of required adversarial perturbations
to evaluate the robustness of different models, as suggested in the DeepFool paper [6]. We notice that
in some papers, an unnormalized norm is used instead, which means
l2 :=
1
|D|
∑
k∈D
‖∆xk‖2 (1)
*The first two authors contributed equally to this work.
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Figure 5: Comparison of different defense methods under the FGS attack. For each network, we
report the success rate of FGS with varying . Lower is better. Best viewed in color.
can also be calculated as a metric (see the fourth column of Table 2). In addition, we further evaluate
the robustness of different models under the C&W’s l2 attack [1], using the official CleverHans [7]
implementation. The (unnormalized) l2 values under the C&W’s l2 attack are reported in the sixth
column of Table 2. Using different reference models trained with different initializations lead to very
similar results in our experiments, so we simply omit such variance (e.g., for l2, it is less than 0.003).
Also, when the FGS attack is adopted, the robustness can be evaluated by replacing the l2 norm with
an l∞ norm in the definition of ρ as the FGS attack is usually considered as an l∞ norm-based (or
max-norm based) perturbation method, and get
ρ∞ :=
1
|D|
∑
k∈D
‖∆xk‖∞
‖xk‖∞ . (2)
in the fifth column of Table 2. Higher l2 and ρ∞ indicate better robustness to the l2 and l∞ attacks,
respectively. Recall that, to establish a benchmark, we adjust  such that 50% of the image samples
are misclassified by well-trained models, as introduced in the main body of our paper. Here we
further compare the FGS success rates with respect to varying  on different models in Figure 5.
As an additional l∞ attack, the PGD-based method [4] is also tested here. We set  = 0.1 for MNIST,
 = 0.01 for CIFAR-10, and compare prediction accuracies on adversarial examples in the seventh
column of Table 2. It can be seen that the superiority of our method holds on various baseline
networks. Recently, Rozsa et.al. [8] propose a psychometric perceptual adversarial similarity score
named PASS, which seems consistent with human perception. The lower such score is, the better
defensive performance the model gets. We calculate it using an official implementation provided by
the authors and report some results in the last column of Table 2.
2 Comparison with Adv. Train II
As introduced in the main body of our paper, various forms of adversarial training have been adopted
in previous works [10, 2, 6, 3, 5, 4]. Here we test Goodfellow et al.’s adversarial training (abbreviated
as “Adv. Train II”). In addition, we also try combining it with our Deep Defense by simply adding the
cross entropy loss corresponding to FGS adversarial examples to the training objective of our method.
The performance of Adv. Train II, our Deep Defense and our combined method are compared in
Figure 6. For each network, we report the ρ2 values under DeepFool in the left column and success
rate of FGS with varying  in the right column.
For our Deep Defense, we fix λ and d and vary only c in the figure, while for the combined method,
we further fix c and vary only , as for Adv. Train II. In the right column, we select winning Adv.
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Figure 6: Comparison with Adv. Train II on both MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets. For each network,
we report the ρ2 values with DeepFool in the left column (upper right is better) and the success rate
of FGS with varying  in the right column (lower is better). Best viewed in color.
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Train II models (under the FGS attack) from those tested in the left. Obviously, we see that our Deep
Defense outperforms Adv. Train II as well in most cases. Moreover, by combining them, we gain
even better robustness and benign-set accuracies, which verifies our previous claim of orthogonality.
3 MNIST Visualization Results
Quantitative results in our paper demonstrate that an adversary has to generate larger perturbations to
successfully attack our regularized models. Intuitively, this implies that the required perturbations
should be perceptually more obvious. Here we provide visualization results in Figure 7. Given a clean
image from the test set (as illustrated in Figure 7(a)), the generated DeepFool adversarial examples
for successfully fooling different models are shown in Figure 7(b)-7(e). Obviously, our method
yields more robust models in comparison with the others, by making the adversarial examples closely
resembling real “8” and “6” images. More interestingly, our regularized LeNet model predicts all
examples in Figure 7(a)-7(d) correctly as “0”. For the lower adversarial example in Figure 7(e), it
makes the correct prediction “0” with a probability of 0.30 and the incorrect one (i.e., “6”) with a
probability of 0.69.
“0”
(a)
→“8”
0.18
→“8”
0.32
→“8”
0.18
→“8”
0.41
→“5”
0.25
(b)
→“8”
0.39
(c)
→“5”
0.28
(d)
→“6”
0.41
(e)
Figure 7: An image (xk) labelled “0” from the MNIST test set with DeepFool examples generated
to fool different models including: (b) the references, (c)-(e): fine-tuned models with Adv. Train I,
Parseval training and our Deep Defense method. Arrows above the pictures indicate which class the
examples are “misclassified” to and the numbers below indicate values of ‖∆xk‖2/‖xk‖2. Upper
images are generated for MLP models and lower images are generated for LeNet models.
4 CIFAR-10 Convergence Curves
Convergence curves on CIFAR-10 of different methods are provided in Figure 8.
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Figure 8: Convergence curves on CIFAR-10: (a)-(b) test accuracy and ρ2 of ConvNet, and (c)- (d)
test accuracy and ρ2 of NIN. “Clean” indicates fine-tuning on benign examples. Best viewed in color.
5 ImageNet Results
Our method yields models with substantially improved robustness and no accuracy loss is observed
on benign test sets, even on ImageNet. Though also enhance models, Parseval and adversarial training
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seem difficult to achieve good trade-offs between robustness and accuracy in our experiments on
ImageNet. On AlexNet, we were unable to find a suitable β such that the fine-tuned model shows
reasonably high accuracy (> 56%) and significantly improved robustness simultaneously for Parseval
training. This phenomenon can possibly be caused by insufficient hyper-parameter search. For Adv.
Train I and II, we observed a decrease of inference accuracy on benign examples when the fine-tuning
process starts, and after 10 epochs the accuracy is still unsatisfactory. However, Kurakin et.al. [3]
have produced an Inception v3 model [9] using 50 machines after 150k iterations (i.e.roughly 187
epochs) of training and obtain only slightly degraded accuracy, so we guess more training epochs and
sophisticated mixture of clean and adversarial examples are required.
6 Network Architectures and Hyper-parameters
Some hyper-parameters for our fine-tuning are summarized in Table 3. Other hyper-parameters like
momentum and weight decay are kept as the same as training the reference models (i.e., momentum:
0.9, and weight decay: 0.0005). Table 4 shows the architecture of networks used in our MNIST and
CIFAR-10 experiments. For AlexNet and ResNet experiments, we directly use the reference models
from the Caffe and PyTorch model zoos.
Table 3: Some hyper-parameters in the fine-tuning process.
Dataset Batch Size #Epoch Base Learning Rate
MNIST 100 5 5×10−4
CIFAR-10 100 50 5×10−4
ImageNet 256 10 1×10−4
Table 4: Network architectures adopted in MNIST and CIFAR-10 experiments. We use Conv-[kernel
width]-[output channel number], FC-[output channel number], MaxPool-[kernel width], AvgPool-
[kernel width] to denote parameters of convolutional layers, fully-connected layers, max pooling
layers and average pooling layers, respectively.
MNIST CIFAR-10
MLP LeNet ConvNet NIN
Input (28×28) Input (32×32)
FC-500 Conv-5-20 Conv-5-32 Conv-5-192
ReLU MaxPool-2 MaxPool-2 ReLU
FC-150 Conv-5-50 ReLU Conv-1-160
ReLU MaxPool-2 Conv-5-32 ReLU
FC-10 FC-500 ReLU Conv-1-96
ReLU AvgPool-2 ReLU
FC-10 Conv-5-64 MaxPool-2
ReLU Conv-5-192
AvgPool-2 ReLU
Conv-4-64 Conv-1-192
ReLU ReLU
Conv-1-10 Conv-1-192
ReLU
AvgPool-2
Conv-3-192
ReLU
Conv-1-192
ReLU
Conv-1-10
AvgPool-8
5
7 Note on Max-unpooling Layers of the Reverse Network
In the main body of our paper, we mimic the DeepFool attack calculation using a neural network.
In order to do this, the forward process of the “reverse” network should generate an exact output as
the backward process of the original classification network. As discussed in the main paper, feasible
“reverse” layers can always be made available when building the reverse network.
Special attention should be paid when reversing max-pooling layers. In many modern DL frameworks
(including TF, PyTorch and Keras), the forward process of a max-unpooling layer is not strictly equal
to the backward process of a max pooling layer, if the stride is smaller than the pooling window size.
In the max pooling operation, if more than one overlapped sliding windows select the same element
from feature maps simultaneously, the derivatives from later feature maps should be summed up in
the backward calculation. However, many DL frameworks just select one of the overlapped windows
and ignore the others in the forward process of a max unpooling, which is slightly different. Such
difference could accumulate layer-by-layer and the final perturbation can be very different from the
original DeepFool, especially for deep networks. We release a patch to fix this along with our source
code at https://github.com/ZiangYan/deepdefense.pytorch.
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